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Abstract. This paper sets out the results of econometric analysis carried out on a 
closed sample of 519 Italian manufacturing firms in order to determine which 
variables affected the probability of a firm investing in ICT in the period 2001-
03, and which variables have an impact on the level of ICT investment. The 
estimates bear out a great many of the theoretical predictions and empirical 
findings,  while  also  casting  new  light  on  the  role  of  vertical  integration  in 
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1.Introduction 
 
According to the Istat survey on information and communication technologies 
in firms with staffs of at least 10 active in the industry and services sector, by January 
2007  the  diffusion  of  computers,  e-mail  and  Internet  connections  had  reached 
practically all the firms, regardless of size and location. Thus, within a span of seven 
years, the process of basic computerisation of Italian firms seems to have arrived at 
its conclusion. Nevertheless, on closer examination the same Istat survey shows a 
rather more limited diffusion and greater differentiation between firms and industries 
when it comes to the more sophisticated applications such as the software set used to 
integrate firm process: LAN (Local Area Networks); Intranet; EDI (Electronic Data 
Interchange);  ERP  (Enterprise  Resource  Planning);  MRP  (Material  Resource 
Planning);  SCM  (Supply  Chain  Management);  and  CRM  (Customer  Relationship 
Management).  The  evidence  shows  Italian  firms  behind  in  adjusting  to  the  new 
technological standards – a lag to be counted among the major causes of the decline 
in total factor productivity over the five-year period 2001-06 (Rossi, 2007). 
It  is  therefore  of  primary  importance  to  see  which  variables  determine  the 
diffusion and extent of adoption of the new technologies, and indeed the issue is 
drawing increasing attention. In the case of the Italian firms, the shortage of empirical 
evidence denounced in the early years of the new century has since been made up 
thanks to contributions by Arduini et al. 2006; Atzeni and Carboni, 2006a; Bugamelli 
and Pagano, 2004; Fabiani et al., 2005; Giunta and Trivieri, 2007; Giuri et al, 2008; 
Neirotti  et  al.,  2008;  Rossi,  2003;  and  Trenti  and  Chiarvesio,  2006.  By  far  the 
majority of these contributions assume firm heterogeneity reflecting differences in 
assessments of the potential profitability of ICT investment, with the consequence 
that the greater the advantage to be expected with ICT investment, the greater will be 
the propensity to invest ahead of other firms (diffusion among firms) and make more 
intensive  use  of  ICT  (use  within  the  firm)  (Hollenstein,  2004,  317-8).  The 
heterogeneity  of  the  agents  implies  that  the  structural  and  organisational 
characteristics are significant factors in accounting for ICT adoption and extent of 
application within the firm. 
Our paper is to be understood in terms of this debate, and within the setting of 
studies so far published on these issues it represents a twofold contribution. In the 
first place, firm behaviour in the field of ICT investment is assessed in terms of both 
the probability that the firm will invest in ICT and the propensity to do so (level of 
ICT  investment  per  employee).  This  choice  led  to  distinction  in  the  econometric 
analysis of the variables that influence a firm’s decisions (to invest or not) from those 
that have an impact on the amount of ICT investment. As we will see, this is justified 
by the fact that the explicative variables are significantly different.  
Secondly, with the introduction of a simple model our paper casts light on the 
relationship between ICT and vertical integration – a relationship that had yet to be 
adequately  examined,  above  all  with  reference  to  Italian  firms.  Our  working 
hypothesis is that, should there be complementarity between ICT investments, in the 
upstream and downstream phases, for two firms, then this very complementarity will   3 
favour  ICT  investments.  The  results  of  the  estimations  bear  out  what  the  model 
suggests, i.e. that a reduced degree of firm vertical integration can imply suboptimal 
ICT investment. This is only a preliminary finding that needs finer definition, but it 
does imply that the – on average –low vertical integration of Italian firms, which has 
characterised the model as from the early 1980s, entails a level of ICT investment 
lower than is to be seen in other countries. 
The  data  used  are  drawn  from  the  Capitalia  triennial  survey  on  Italian 
manufacturing firms for the periods 1995-97, 1998-2000 and 2001-03; econometric 
analysis is carried out on a closed sample of 519 firms. Although numerically limited, 
the closed sample also enables us to make use of the time variable of the phenomenon 
under analysis, verifying for possible persistence effects in the investment decisions. 
The  paper  is  structured  thus:  the  following  section  (§2)  provides  a  concise 
examination  of  ICT  adoption  determinants.  With  the  help  of  a  model,  the  third 
explores  the  relationship  between  vertical  integration  and  ICT,  while  the  fourth 
illustrates the econometric technique and the results of the estimations; our conclusions 
are set out in the last section (§ 5). 
 
 
2. Adoption and propensity to invest in ICT: a brief overview of the theoretical 
and empirical literature. 
 
  In this section we look into the theoretical predictions and empirical findings 
regarding certain structural and organisational characteristics that prove – especially 
in  the  case  of  Italian  firms  –  most  relevant  in  accounting  for  ICT  investment 
decisions and propensity. 
 
Size 
As we have seen, ICT diffusion is by now well advanced within the economic 
system,  to  the  extent  that  firm  size  no  longer  has  any  influence  on  basic 
computerisation, i.e. use of PCs, e-mail and website. However, size still represents a 
decisive variable when it comes to complex applications. The positive correlation 
between  size  and  ICT  is  in  the  first  place  fruit  of  a  “Schumpeterian”  effect 
(Schumpeter 1934): the larger firms have greater resources to invest in technological 
innovations  and,  thanks  to  a  higher  absorption  capacity,  are  better  equipped  to 
appropriate the resulting returns. Secondly, favouring size is the fact that use of ICT 
calls for considerable formalization of procedures and information/communication 
systems,  normally  somewhat  lacking in small  firms  (Fabiani et al., 2005),  where 
informality tends to characterise exchanges. Moreover, as we will be seeing in greater 
detail, the presence of complementarity between ICT, level of human capital and 
reorganizational  processes,  without  which  the  ICT  productivity  hikes  cannot  be 
concretized marked, does not in practice favour small firms (Giuri et al., 2008).  
 
Human capital and reorganisation processes 
   4 
It is argued in a great many studies that ICT yield gains in efficiency and 
productivity only when accompanied by organisational changes both within the firm 
and in exchanges with other firms. What makes internal and external reorganisation 
necessary is the fact that ICT bring changes in the forms and rates of information 
transmission.  ICT  can  entail  the  need  for  flatter  organisational  structures  with 
reduction in the hierarchic levels and wider-reaching control over each level (Trento 
and  Warglien,  2003).  In  addition,  ICT  entail  training  and  specific  skills  for  the 
workers – hence the connotation of ICT as skill-biased technological change. It may 
then be reasonably conjectured that firms with good levels of human capital will be 
the first to use, and subsequently make more intensive use of, ICT due to the fact that 
their workers show a greater capacity to absorb the new technological paradigm. In 
other  words,  at  the  theoretical  level  a  close  link  is  hypothesized  between  ICT 
adoption,  organisational  changes,  level  of  human  capital,  a  so  called  “micro-
complementarity”, proposed in a great many contributions (to begin with, Bresnahan, 
1999 and, subsequently, Bresnahan et al., 2002; Brynjolfsson et al., 2002; Gretton et 
al., 2004), which constitutes the prerequisite to be able to concretise the productivity 
gain that ICT could generate.   
As for the empirical findings, what emerges unequivocally are: i) the positive 
link between  level of human  capital  and  ICT  adoption  (for  the Italian  firms,  see 
Becchetti et al., 2003; Lucchetti and Sterlacchini, 2004; Fabiani et al., 2005); 
 ii) the inverse correlation between incidence of blue collars in the firm’s staff 
and ICT diffusion (Atzeni and Carboni, 2006b; Bugamelli and Pagano, 2004; Giunta 
and Trivieri 2007). On the other hand, somewhat contradictory evidence emerges on 
the impact of organisational change and use of ICT. The problem seems to lie mainly 
in the poor quality of the data used as proxy for organisational change, suggesting 
that the lack of real significance may be due to the choice of an inadequate proxy 




  Firm age is frequently used in the theoretical literature on adoption of a 
new technology (Karshenas and Stoneman, 1995), while relatively few studies take 
firm age into consideration as explicative variable in the specific case of the new 
technology  being  represented  by  ICT.  The  theoretical  arguments  on  the  impact 
exerted by age do not lead to univocal evaluations. Positive age impact may reflect 
technological experience (and is indeed thus used in the empirical analysis by Atzeni 
and  Carboni,  2006b),  although it  may  come  up  against organisational  adjustment 
costs, higher in the older firms with more consolidated routines (Hollenstein, 2004, 
320).  In  this  respect,  by  virtue  of  the  role  played  by  organisational  changes 
Gambardella and Torrisi (2001) hypothesise that young firms are more inclined to 
adopt ICT, being less averse to setting about the organisational changes entailed by 
“micro-complementarity”. 
 
Geographical location    5 
 
  The  country  is  divided  into  geographical  macro-areas  to  detect  whatever 
territorial differences there may be in the diffusion of ICT at the firm level. Here a 
role is played by the adoption differentials already observed both for the Southern 
Italian firms, as noted by Atzeni and Carboni (2006b; Giunta and Trivieri, 2007) and 
for  the  firms  located  in  the  industrial  districts,  in  the  regions  of  the  North-East-
Centre. In fact, Trento and Warglien (2003) observe that procedures for the exchange 
of information among the district firms, whether circulating within or outwards, are 
essentially  informal,  thus  making  less  use  of  ICT.  However,  more  recent  studies 
(Trenti et al., 2006, on a sample of 619 firms located in 41 industrial districts) point 
to  a  more  intensive  and  sophisticated  use  of  ICT,  although  this  seems  to  be  the 
prerogative of groups of firms showing high growth dynamics, and more outward 
looking in terms of both final markets and exchanges with other firms. This is a point 
we shall be looking into more closely later on. Finally, Fabiani et al., 2005, find no 
significant difference in adoption between district firms and firms located in other 







  The last fifteen years have seen increasing fragmentation of production coming 
about with the outsourcing of significant segments of the productive process to other 
firms outside the country
1 – a process that has undoubtedly been catalysed by ICT. In 
fact, with codified and, consequently, transmittable knowledge, ICT favour operation 
through a long production network thanks to a series of applications that cut the costs 
of coordination between units in the network and ease off “space friction”, making 
geographical proximity between firms less of a binding necessity. For at least ten 
years this phenomenon has also been developing in Italy, where the division of labour 
between firms has been one of the major features of the organisational pattern. From 
this  point  of  view,  one  might  expect  that  the  greater  the  proportion  of  turnover 
involving subcontracting activities, the more frequent and intensive should be the 
exchanges with other firms, and thus the greater the advantage of using coordination 
technologies such as ICT. This implies a positive correlation between ICT investment 
and the proportion of turnover accounted for by subcontracting activities. Such, for 
example, is the finding of Lucchetti and Sterlacchini (2004).   
The  positive  correlation  may  depend  not  only  on  manufacture  in 
subcontracting per se, but also on the type of industry the firm works in and the 
position it occupies in the value chain. For example, in a considerable number of  
                                                
1 The complex of phase sequences and activities necessary for the production of a final good has progressively been 
falling into the pattern of a value chain with global extension. By value chain we mean the series of activities for the 
final production and subsequent sale of a good. When the subdivision of activities calls for the contribution of firms 
located in different parts of the world, the value chain is said to have global extension.    6 
industries,  including  for  example  the  automobile  and  aeronautic  industries,  the 
division of labour between firms is organised hierarchically, in a pyramid structure 
with the big firm attending to coordination. The “head” of the value chain plays the 
role of “standard maker” and decides on the applications to be adopted by the various 
segments  of  the  chain  to  reduce  costs  in  the  exchange  of  information.  “For  the 
suppliers,  the  choice  of  ICT  investments  thus  depends  largely  on  the  needs  of 
coordination with the choices of other firms in the chain, and this network externality 
reduces uncertainties about the standards to adopt, limiting investment risks” (Trento 
and Warglien, 2003).  
Trenti  et  al.  (2006)  find  that  the  position  in  the  value  chain  also  has  a 
significant impact; firms in contact with the final markets are, in fact, more inclined 
to  make  greater  investment  in  ICT.  Nevertheless,  as  is  demonstrated  by  various 
studies on the relationship between subcontracting and profitability (Kimura, 2002; 
and,  for  the  Italian  case,  Giunta,  Scalera,  2007),  subcontracting  activity  is  often 
performed  by  marginal  firms,  positioned  in  the  lower  levels  of  the  value  chain, 
showing relatively simple functional structures and scant technological endowment. 
In such cases we might even expect a negative relationship between subcontracting 
activity and ICT adoption. 
 
3. Vertical integration and ICT investment  
 
Over  and  above  the  issues  discussed  in  the  previous  section,  another  point 
emerging from the literature as important is the interaction between vertical integration 
and ICT investment. In fact, some scholars have found an inverse relationship between 
ICT  investment  and  vertical  integration  (Brynjolfsson,  Malone,  Gurbaxany  and 
Kambil, 1994; Hitt, 1999). The theoretical justification for this finding is that ICT 
reduces  the  costs  of  external  coordination  with  the  suppliers  (Malone,  Yates  and 
Benjamin,  1987;  Gurbaxani  and  Whang,  1991;  Clemons  and  Row,  1992),  cuts 
transaction costs and thus favours vertical disintegration of the firm. 
ICT  certainly  reduce  the  costs  of  use  of  suppliers,  which  account  for  a 
significant part of the transaction costs, but this does not seem in itself sufficient to 
hypothesise  that  ICT  adoption  can  entail,  tout  court,  a  reduction  in  vertical 
integration. In our opinion, ICT fail to reduce many of the costs involved in drawing 
up contracts with outside agents (subcontractors and suppliers, in the first place), 
decisive in transaction cost theory (suffice it to recall the situations that arise from 
contractual incompleteness). In particular, it is the ex post costs, associated with the 
contemporaneous  effects  of  bounded  rationality  and  opportunism,  that  do  play  a 
highly significant role in Williamson’s theory of vertical integration, and which do 
not appear to be appreciably affected by ICT.  
Moreover, according to the transaction theory of Coase (1937) and Williamson 
(1975), it is the differential between coordination costs and transaction costs that 
determines, coeteris paribus, whether a transaction will be performed within the firm 
or outside. We may therefore reasonably suppose that ICT contributes to bringing 
down internal coordination costs just as it does in reducing market use costs. To take   7 
just  two  examples,  the  possibility  of  hierarchical  organisation  in  receiving  and 
processing the internal information flow is undoubtedly enhanced by ever growing 
computer calculation capacity and ever more sophisticated software. Thanks to this 
capacity,  moreover, improved monitoring can be made of the performance of the 
individual  employees  and  appropriate  incentive  measures,  for  example,  can  be 
proposed. 
Indeed, apart from explaining the effect of ICT on levels of integration, the same 
arguments can be taken to illustrate why firms invest in ICT. ICT investments can be 
viewed in terms of any new technology which is adopted if the additional investment 
is less than the present value of saving determined by the lower operating costs to be 
borne. In our case such costs obviously comprise both the transaction costs and the 
costs  of  internal  coordination.  In  terms  of  reduced  costs,  as  demonstrated  in  the 
literature examined in the previous section, the advantages of ICT will be all the 
greater  in  proportion  to  the  organisational  changes  made  in  the  firm.  With  this 
approach we can also appreciate the effects of ICT on vertical integration and the 
advantage there may be in investing in ICT.  
As for the advantageousness of investing in ICT, it cannot be argued a priori, 
using  transaction  cost  theory,  turnover  being  equal,  whether  it  is  greater  in  a 
vertically integrated firm than in a disintegrated one. ICT reduces both transaction 
and coordination costs, but we cannot tell a priori whether the differential between 
the two costs narrows or widens. If coordination costs decrease more than transaction 
costs, it will be the vertically integrated firms that reap the major benefit and vice 
versa. It may also be that this differential is diversely affected according to the levels 
from which vertical integration is started.  
There are, moreover, various other reasons to argue that vertically integrated 
firms invest more in ICT than the disintegrated firms. This is an aspect than can be 
analysed with simple reasoning. Let us take the case of a component necessary for the 
production of a final good, and let us assume that improvement can be made in the 
typology  of  the  good  thanks  to  co-design  activity  between  producer  (firm  or 
department within a vertically integrated firm) and user for production of the final 
good. Co-design calls for electronic exchange of data and platforms shared between the 
two parts. To produce the component, the engineers of the client and supplier firms 
must get involved in close, intensive communication. Thus the need is for both parties 
to  invest  in  ICT  before  the  component  can  be  produced.  The  greater  the  ICT 
investments made by the two parties, the higher will be the quality of the component 
produced. Moreover, the quality of the component produced will only be known after 
the ICT investments opening up communication between the two parties have been 
made. 
Let us now go on to consider the case of two disintegrated firms, one supplying 
a certain input and one producing the final good or service. Let us assume that the 
two parties undertake to trade the good at a certain price, but that, if an improvement 
in productivity is achieved thanks to the organisational and technological endeavours 
of  the  two  parties,  then  the  supplier  firm  is  awarded  percentage  α   of  the 
accomplishment, which can translate into an increase in the value of the improvement   8 
due to technological progress. Should the case be, as often it is in many sectors, that 
marked technological complementarity holds between component and final product, 
for the improvement to be brought about technological progress must be introduced 
in both the supplier and the client firm. Let us take the value of the improvement in 
the component to come to V and that it will be all the greater the higher the ICT 
investments made by both the supplier and the client firm.  
Let us compare this situation with the case of a vertically integrated firm. The 
idea is that the vertically integrated firm will know the effects that can accrue to it in 
terms  of  improvement  due  to  investments  by  both  producer  and  user  of  the 
component. Should the firms be producing in the disintegrated mode, they will know 
only  the  effects  that  can  accrue  from  the  investments  they  make  in  their  own 
activities, for production of both the component and the final good.
2 
These  differences  influence  the  incentives  to  invest  in  ICT,  depending  on 
whether the firms show vertically integrated or disintegrated organisation. 
Let V=f(ICTx, ICTy) where ICTx and ICTy represent the sum of investments 
made  by  firm  x  and  firm  y,  and  V  the  increase  in  value  deriving  from  these 
investments. 
 
The profits of the vertically integrated firm, supposing the improvement is achieved 
will be, in comparison with normal profits,  
 
( ) y X y x y x ICT ICT ICT ICT Vf − − = + , π   (1) 
 
The vertically integrated firm producing both the component and the final product 
can decide on the investment to be made in turning out both the final product and the 
productive component. Let us, then, maximize the profit relatively to investment in 
ICT in production of the factor and of the final product. The first-order conditions can 






























Let us now take the case of two vertically disintegrated firms. Neither of the firms 
will know the effects resulting from investment by the other firm, and each will 
therefore maximize profits in relation to the only investment variable it controls. We 
will then have  
                                                
2 Our argument begins with the issue of the appropriability  of the results of innovations and follows the lines pursued in 
the contributions by Holmstrom (1982) and Tirole (1998), which show how the distribution of authority affects the 
division of gains deriving from trade and so on the incentive to invest. V indicates the extra valuation that can be 
derived in trade when investments are made, as compared with normal gains.    9 
 
( ) x y x x ICT ICT ICT V − = , α π      (3) 
 
( ) ( ) y y x y ICT ICT ICT V − − − = , 1 α π     (4) 
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respectively for firm x and firm y. 
Let us conjecture that the value of V grows with growing investments,  0 ' ' >
y x ICT ICT eV V  
but shows decreasing returns on the investments  0 ' ' <
y x ICT ICT eV V  
In  this  case  it  is  clear  that  the  sum  of  investments  ICTx+ICTy  made  by  the 
disintegrated firms falls below that of the vertically integrated firm. 
Let us take an example considering  y x ICT ICT V + = . 
From the first-order conditions for the vertically integrated firm we will see that the 
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This indicates that the sum of two vertically disintegrated firms’ ICT investments 
will come short of that of a vertically integrated firm, and this is all the more so in the 
case of a vertically disintegrated firm producing for the final market. In this model 
the vertically integrated firm invests more in ICT and shows a higher value for V than 
the vertically disintegrated firms
3. 
This  model  does  not  imply  that  the  vertically  integrated  firms  are  more 
efficient than the non-integrated firms, but simply that the complementarity in ICT 
investments in the upstream and downstream stages favours ICT investments in the 
vertically integrated firms. Obviously, if the vertically integrated firm is less efficient 
than the two disintegrated firms, for example on account of high coordination costs, 
and the value of the improvement in the integrated firm comes short of the value that 
could be obtained in two disintegrated firms, then the value of the vertically integrated 




4. Econometric analysis 
 
The data used in the empirical analysis are from the Survey on manufacturing 
firms carried out by Capitalia; in particular, the sample was drawn from the last three 
data collections, with a time span thus running from 1995 to 2003. The initial dataset 
was reduced in order to have as unit for analysis only the firms answering in all three 
surveys,  with  the  result  that  the  sample  upon  which  econometric  analysis  was 
eventually  carried  out  consisted  of  519  firms.  Although  numerically  limited,  the 
closed sample offered the possibility to make use also of the temporal variability of 
the phenomenon under analysis, verifying for the presence of persistence effects in 
investment  decisions.  The  firms  answering  the  question  on  the  amount  of  ICT 
investment made in the three-year period were: 474 in the 1995 – 1997 survey; 476 in 
the 1998 – 2000 survey; and 420 in the 2001 – 2003 survey. From the original sample 
we eliminated 4 firms for the first survey, 5 for the second and 3 for the third, as they 
                                                
3It is worth noting the analogies of the results obtained with those obtained by Bresnahan- Trajtenberg (1995) in a model 
in which there is a sector (semiconductors) which produces “General Purpose technologies”(GPT) and a great many 
application sectors (AS) that use them. This model shows a divergence between the social optimum, entailing higher 
levels of investment, and a decentralized Nash equilibrium. The cause for this divergence lies in the complementarity 
between the levels of innovation pursued in the various sectors and the feedback effects the innovations generate. The 
firms in each AS application sector and GPT sector innovate only if there is a mechanism allowing for appropriation of 
the social surplus. The problem is that the incentive for innovation downstream, in a decentralized equilibrium, is too 
low, and consequently neither of the firms upstream or downstream has sufficient incentive to innovate.  
   11 
showed  ICT  investment  and  total  investment  values  departing  wide  of  the  other 
firms’ values.  
Table 1 sets out some descriptive statistics calculated for the sample employed 
and the entire dataset from which the sample was drawn. As far as periods 1995-97 
and 1998-2000 are concerned, it emerges that the sample extracted consists of firms 
showing characteristics very similar to those of the entire set of firms on which the 
Capitalia  survey  was  conducted.  For  example,  the  ratio  between  turnover  per 
employee in the closed sample and that for all the firms is 0.92 for the three-year 
period 1995-97 and 1.09 for the following triennium. On the other hand, in the case 
of the 2001-03 period the ratio comes to 0.75 with corresponding ICT investment per 
employee value of 0.72. Thus on average, and in particular in the last survey (2001-
2003),  the  firms  we  analysed  invested  in  ICT  less  than  observed  in  the  Survey. 
Finally, with regard to the value added, the ratio is greater than 1 for the 1998-2000 
survey, and slightly less than unity in the last survey. In general, however, the ratio 
values differ little from 1. 
 
Table 1 – Sample selection 
  ict ratio  va ratio  to ratio  
1995 - 1997  0.88  1.01  0.92 
1998 - 2000  0.95  1.19  1.09 
2001 - 2003  0.72  0.91  0.75 
Legend:  ict  ratio  is  the  ratio  between  average  ICT 
investment per employee in the closed sample and the 
average  calculated  for  the  entire  dataset.  Similar 
definitions  apply  to the  other  ratios: va is the value 





The explicative variables involved in the analysis are: 
￿  Total value added; 
￿  Total turnover; 
￿  Proportion of turnover accounted for by subcontracting activities; 
￿  Proportion of blue collars workers; 
￿  Average years of education per employee; 
￿  Degree  of  indebtedness  (current  and  medium-long-term  liabilities/  capital 
invested);  
￿  Age (number of years as from incorporation); 
￿  Dummy R&D; 
￿  Investment in machinery and equipment per employee; 
￿  Dummies for sector (Pavitt Classification), geographical area and legal form.   12 
 
All the monetary variables are given in millions of Euros. The value added (VA) and 
total turnover (Tto) find their place in the estimated specifications such as to capture 
at  the  same  time  the  twofold  dimension-organization  effect  which  we  consider 
relevant in accounting for ICT investment and, moreover, to take into account the 
non-linear nature of the effect. In particular, the various equation estimated have as 
dependent variable ICT investment per employee and as determinants VA and VATO 
where VATO is the product of VA and TtO: 
Other cVATO bVA a ICT + + + =   
To  appreciate  the  significance  of  the  preceding  relationship  note  that  the 
marginal  effect  of  the  greater  total  value  added,  for  a  given  turnover  value,  is 
measured with coefficients b and c and is equal to ” b+cTto”. Given the total turnover 
value, the preceding expression can thus be interpreted as the impact that a higher 
value added/turnover ratio, and so a higher degree of vertical integration, has on ICT 
investment. As we will see later on, this variable will prove particularly significant in 
accounting for the level of investment per employee, while it will not prove decisive 
in accounting for a firm’s choice to invest in ICT. Since our specification takes into 
account the product between value added and turnover, this implies the possibility to 
capture a non-linear effect of firm size – measured by the level of turnover – on ICT 
investment, degree of vertical integration being equal.   
Let us take the case, for example, of a given value added/turnover ratio by 
virtue of which the level of vertical integration is constant regardless of the size 
value. The preceding equation implies a quadratic relationship between investment 
and turnover, taking a shape like an inverted U if parameter c is less than zero. Thus, 
for each value of the value added percentage with respect to turnover, we have a curve 
that we may interpret as an “iso-organization” curve. If, then, we interpret the value 
added-turnover ratio as indicator of vertical integration, we see that, as the ratio grows, 
so we move up on a higher “iso-organization” curve: thus, the greater the vertical 
integration, the higher will prove the level of ICT investment per employee. 
To verify that a higher value added captures a dimension-organization effect on 
ICT investment, and not, rather, a greater readiness to make investments in general, 
we  also  take  account,  in  the  control  variables  set,  of  the  level  of  investment  in 
machinery  and  equipment  per  employee  (Inv_emp).  However,  the  results  prove 
similar with or without this control variable.  
Finally, to verify the possibility that investment decisions are characterised by 
persistence effects we took into account the lag in the dependent variable. As further 
proxy  of  the firm’s  organisational  structure we  also  considered  the  proportion  of 
turnover deriving from subcontracting (Subto)  
The  other  regressors  considered  are  prompted  by  the  empirical  literature 
mentioned above, and thus have the same justifications. For human capital we used 
the  average  years  of  education  per  employee  (education_emp)  and  a  positive 
correlation with ICT is to be expected. We also verify for the proportion of blue 
collar workers in the total of employees (blue-collars_emp), for which the relevant 
literature  finds  a  negative  correlation  with  ICT  investment.  With  regard  to  the   13 
financial situation of the firm, we included a debt measurement (debt), given by the 
ratio between current and medium- long-term liabilities and capital invested. It may 
reasonably  be  assumed  that  the  firms  with  greater  investments  in  research  and 
development  are  also  the  firms  that  invest  more  in  ICT,  and  in  this  respect  we 
brought in a dummy to detect this possibility. Finally, we also added some other 
control variables such as the age of the firm, measured in years since the year of 
incorporation, three sector dummies in accordance with Pavitt classification, and a 
legal form dummy
4. 
                                                
4 Description of the variables are set out below the tables. The estimations presented show the specification with the 
greater reliability. The authors can supply other model specifications (in particular with inclusion of the geographic area 
variables)  on request.    14 
Table 2 – Descriptive Statistics  
1998-2000   
ict_emp  inv_emp  va  vato  education_emp  blue-
collars_emp  debt 
Average  0.4164  7.22409    2.85598    368.1922    9.84165    6.60362    0.72393   
Standard 
Deviation   0.5344    8.8529    11.3982    3237.605    1.2999    1.4664   0.1708   
Min  0  0  0  0  8  0  0.1899         
Max  3.7932  65.7747    151.1707    51288.84         17    11.6875    1.0061       
               
2001-2003   
ict_emp  inv_emp  va  vato  education_emp  blue-
collars_emp  debt 
Average  0.4117    6.0407    2.1039    112.0699    10.0954    6.9564    0.7051   
Standard 
Deviation   0.5833    7.0396    4.6990    760.9867    1.2996    1.6476    0.1770   
Min  0  0  0.0119    0.0129    8.1316          0  0.1807         
Max  4.5931        60    46.2523    8193.021    14.2308         13    1.0527       
               
Note. All the variables are constructed as average over the three years. ict_emp is 
ICT investment per employee; inv_emp is investment per employee; va is the total 
value added; vato is the product between value added and turnover; education_emp 
is  the  average  of  years  of  education  per  employee;  blue-collars_emp  is  the 
proportion  of  total  staff  accounted  for  by  blue  collars;  debt  is  an  index  of 
indebtedness; Subto is the percentage of turnover accounted for by subcontracting. 
 
Table 2 show various descriptive statistics regarding the principal variables 
used in the empirical analysis. The statistics were calculated separately for the two 
surveys used in the estimations. In general, the averages in the two periods come very 
close, apart from: a) the variable of interaction between value added and turnover, 
which shows a higher average and variance for the 1998-2000 period than for the 
subsequent  three-year  period;  b)  the  proportion  of  turnover  accounted  for  by 
subcontracting, which shows a higher average in the later survey but similar variance 
in the two periods. 
In the following table (table 3) we see the correlation coefficients calculated 
for the same variables. In both periods a negative correlation emerges between ICT 
investment per employee and value added per turnover, as also between ICT and 
proportion  of  blue  collars  (blue-collars_emp),  while  the  correlation  with  ICT  per 
employee (ict_emp) is consistently positive for level of investment in machinery or 
equipment  per  employee  and  value  added;  the  sign  of  the  other  variables  is  not   15 
constant over the two periods. Finally, as expected, high correlation emerges between 
value added and the term of interaction between value added and turnover (Vato).   16 
Table 3 – Correlation Matrix 
1998-2000 
 
ict_emp  inv_emp  va  vato  education_emp  blue-
collars_emp  debt  subto
ict_emp  1             
inv_emp  0.2022    1           
va  0.0061    -
0.0079    1         
vato  -
0.0286   
-
0.0330    0.9595    1       




0.0106    0.0709    0.0572    0.0166    0.1121    1   
debt  0.0086    -
0.0360   
-
0.0643    -0.0597    -0.0440    -0.0786    1 
subto  0.0258    -








ict_emp  inv_emp  va  vato  education_emp  blue-
collars_emp  debt  subto
ict_emp  1             
inv_emp  0.2202   1           
va  0.0927    0.0481    1         
vato  -
0.0083    0.0101    0.8970  1       
education_emp  0.1499  -




0.2088  0.0258    -
0.0411   
-






0.0159    0.0356    -0.0108    -0.0662    1 
subto  -
0.0021   
-
0.0843   
-
0.0509   
-
0.0957    -0.0244    0.0757    0.0735  1
Note. All the variables are constructed as average over the three years. ict_emp is 
investment in ICT per employee; inv_emp is investment per employee; va is the total 
value added; vato is the product between value added and turnover; education_emp 
is  the  average  of  years  of  education  per  employee;  blue-collars_emp  is  the 
proportion  of  total  staff  accounted  for  by  blue  collars;  debt  is  an  index  of 
indebtedness; subto is the percentage of turnover accounted for by subcontracting. 
   17 
We  began  our  econometric  analysis  using  the  complete  sample,  containing 
both  non-investing  firms  (dependent  variable  value  =  0)  and  firms  that  invested 
(dependent  variable  value  =  ICT  investment  per  employee),  adopting  the  OLS 
method.
5  In  this estimation the  regressors  are lagged to  minimise the  risk of  our 
estimations being invalidated by endogeneity problems. Table 4 shows that the ICT 
investment lag per employee does not appear significant, while both the value added 
and  the  term  of  interaction  between  value  added  and  turnover  do  in  fact  prove 
significant. Note that these conclusions remain valid even should we confine our 
attention to the later survey alone. In particular, a positive sign is found for the VA 
coefficient, a negative sign for the VATO coefficient. In the light of our preceding 
observations this implies that, turnover being equal, ICT investment increases with 
growing value added, suggesting a positive correlation between investment and a 
proxy for the degree of vertical integration. At the same time, the VATO coefficient 
being negative the preceding effect is marginally decreasing with growing firm size. 
The human capital variable is significant and has the expected positive sign; the same 
result is observed for the blue-collars variable. As for the other regressors, only debt 
and  total  investment  in  machinery  and  equipment  are  significant:  the  greater  the 
indebtedness of the firm, the less will be its investment in ICT, which however grows 
with  growing  total  investment.  As  for  the  coefficient  of  the  subcontracting 
activity/total turnover variable, it shows the negative sign as expected in our model, 
but is not significant. Thus in our estimations, while the type of transactions in which 
the firm is involved as client (indicated by the degree of vertical integration) affects 
ICT and vertical integration is seen to have a positive effect on ICT investment (as 
illustrated above), such is not the case with the transaction typology in which the firm 
is a subcontracting firm, involved as producer of goods and services for other firms. 
As pointed out above, this result could derive from the presence of marginal firms 
performing low-quality work with scant technological content.   
                                                
5 It was not possible to carry out in addition panel analysis with fixed effects due to the limited time variability of our 
sample.   18 
 
Table 4 – OLS estimation 




(-1.24)    0.18431** 
(3.3)   





























































































Obs  633  674  532  565 
Note. All the variables are constructed as average for the three-year period concerned, indicated in 
brackets. The t–values are in parentheses; significant coefficients are indicated by * (5% level) and 
** (1% level). ict_emp is investments in ICT per employee, va is total value added, vato is the 
product between value added and turnover, education_emp is the average of years of education per 
employee, blue-collars_emp is the proportion of total staff accounted for by blue collars, debt is 
the index of indebtedness, subto is the percentage of turnover accounted for by subcontracting, 
dR&D is a dummy given value 1 if the firm engages in R&D activities, age is the number of years 
as from incorporation of the firm, inv_emp is investment per employee, d98 is a dummy for 1998.  
 
In the sample considered some firms state that they have not invested in ICT. In 
particular, in the 1998-2000 survey there are 71 firms declaring zero investment in 
ICT, while the number rises to 80 in the 2001-2003 survey. The results obtained 
considering only the firms making positive investment are in line with the findings 
emerging from estimation on the entire sample except for the years of education, 
which no longer appear significant (table 4, third column). A possible interpretation 
of the fact that when firms not investing in ICT are included in the sample a positive   19 
correlation with education emerges, while the correlation disappears when the non-
investing  firms  are  excluded  from  the  sample,  is  that  education  is  a  significant 
variable in accounting for the firm’s decision as to whether to invest, but not for the 
decision as to how much to invest.  
Excluding from the sample the firms declaring zero ICT investment the OLS 
estimator could be distorted. Moreover, any correlation that might appear between the 
factors  influencing  the  decision  to  invest  and  those  that  determine  the  level  of 
investment implies a problem of sample selection. In order to take such problems into 
account we estimated the model with a two-stage estimation procedure (Heckit). The 
first step consists in a Probit regression on the dichotomic dependent variable which 
takes on value 1 for all the firms that have invested in ICT, regardless of the level of 
investment, and value 0 for the firms that have made no ICT investment. Essentially, 
we  study  with  a  probabilistic  regression  the  significance  of  a  set  of  firm 
characteristics in the decision to adopt ICT. The second stage is based on a regression 
including among the regressors a term of correction for the problem of distortion in 
sample selection; with this equation, where the dependent variable is the level of ICT 
investment per employee, we can bring out the factors affecting the decision as to 
how much to invest in ICT. For this type of procedure validity is guaranteed by the 
lambda Mills, which departs significantly from zero in both the equations estimated 
(with and without ICT lag). This means that the OLS estimations prove distorted due 
to the omission of a relevant variable. In particular, in order to obtain some indication 
regarding the variables to use in the Heckman model selection equation, we begin by 
estimating a Probit model with all the regressors so far considered (table 5).   20 
Table 5 – Heckit estimation 
  Probit  Heckman   
      selection  investment  selection  investment 
ict_occ1998-2000  -0.0089**  











  0.01989* 
(2.18) 
  0.02660** 
(2.85) 




  -0.00009* 
(-2.53) 









(3.08)   
0.14879** 







  -0.08625** 
(-5.09) 
  -0.08947** 
(-5.20) 




  -0.41173** 
(-2.83) 
  -0.34266* 
(-2.37) 




  -0.00073 
(-1.31) 
  -0.00052 
(-0.93) 





(2.82)   
0.29271* 
(2.42)   




  0.00135 
(0.94) 
  0.00122 
(0.85) 







































(2.46)   
0.60546* 
2.46   




























  0.02110** 
(6.77) 
  0.02082** 
(6.77) 


























Mills lambda        -0.43461* 
(-2.07) 
  -0.63732* 
(-2.62) 
Obs  609  647    648    688 
Note. All the variables are constructed average over the three-year period concerned, indicated in 
brackets. The t–values are in parentheses; significant coefficients are indicated by * (5% level) and 
** (1% level). ict_emp is ICT investment per employee, va is the total value added, vato is the 
product between value added and turnover, education_emp is the average years of education per 
employee, blue-collars_emp is the proportion of staff accounted for by blue collar workers, debt is 
an index of indebtedness, subto is the percentage of turnover accounted for by subcontracting, 
dR&D is a dummy taking on value 1 if the firm engages in R&D activities, age is the number of   21 
years as from the year of incorporation of the firm. Other dummies included are: group, if the firm 
belongs  to  a  group;  incentives,  if  the  firm  has  received  financial  and/or  fiscal  incentives; 
consortium, if the firm belong to a consortium; sperson, if it is an individual or a public limited 
company; Public limited company; the sector dummies are: scale, specialized, high technology. 
inv_emp is investment per employee, d98 is a dummy for 1998.  
 
According to the results of our estimations, the factors that influence a firm’s 
decision to adopt ICT are: the average level of education – the higher it is, the more 
likely the firm is to invest in ICT; engagement in R&D activities – firms so doing are, 
again, more likely to invest in ICT; being a public limited company; persistence, 
captured by the lag in investment per employee. These variables were introduced into 
the selection equation estimated with the Heckman model. The first step of the model 
confirmed that education, R&D and being organised a public limited company are 
factors influencing decisions to adopt  ICT.  The  results  of the second step of the 
model, regarding the variables influencing the level of ICT investment, are in line 
with the previous findings and, at least to some extent, with the relevant literature. In 
particular, the amount of ICT investment increases with the increase in investment in 
the preceding period, and with growth in the total investment per employee. On the 
other hand, ICT investment decreases with higher proportions of blue collars and 
higher indebtedness. Exactly the same considerations made previously also apply to 
the variables of major interest in that work, namely VA and VATO. 
In conclusion, empirical analysis reveals that different factors affect decisions as to 
“whether to invest” and “how much to invest”. The factors that prove decisive in the 
decision  whether  to  invest  are  human  capital  and  R&D  activity.  The  elements 
affecting  the  amount  of  investment  are  size,  the incidence  of  value  added  in the 
turnover,  and  persistence.  Investment  in  ICT  increases  with  increasing  vertical 




In this paper we set out to bring further light to bear on the factors accounting 
for the decision to adopt ICT and the level of such investment among Italian firms 
over a relatively recent period of time – the period 2001-03 – marked by a decline in 
total factor productivity due largely to the lag shown by Italian firms in adapting to 
the technological changes coming in with ICT. Achieved with appropriate modelling 
and  econometric estimation, our findings largely bear out the predictions advanced in 
the theoretical literature and in empirical observations on the marked heterogeneity of 
the firms and the explicative relevance of a limited but remarkably robust set of 
variables.  
Our reference here is to an adequate level of human capital employed in the 
firm and engagement in R&D activities as determinants in the decision whether or 
not to invest in ICT. In all respects these findings represent further proof of the severe 
limitations involved in the pattern “small size/specialization in the traditional sectors” 
– standing in the way of wider ICT diffusion in Italian industry and so obstructing 
increase in total factor productivity. In fact, the explicative capacity of both variables   22 
shows that only firms with adequate functional range, not limited solely and entirely 
to  manufacturing activity, and a high level of human capital take the decision to 
invest  in  ICT  and,  thanks  to  the  employees’  capacity  to  adapt,  implement  the 
organisational changes necessary to guarantee future increases in productivity. This  
firm typology is, on average, more frequent in the sectors with high economies to 
scale  and  high  technology  –  industries  which  are  not  the  core  of  the  Italian 
specialization. It might be objected that by now ICT can be characterised as general 
purpose technologies, with a wide range of application, allowing for increases in 
productivity whatever industry the firm may operate in. Nevertheless, our findings 
show  that  this  is  not  altogether  the  case,  seeing  that  low  levels  of  R&D  and 
dependence on a large proportion of blue collars mean that a firm is less likely to take 
the decision to invest in ICT. Here we find ourselves echoing the point made by 
Bresnahan and Trajtenberg (1995): the diffusion of technologies over a wide range 
and consequent technological advance in the industrial system depend also on the 
characteristics prevailing among the industries making use of them.  
With regard to identification of the variables accounting for ICT investment 
per employee, our findings show that size, greater vertical integration and persistence 
of investment in ICT have a positive effect on ICT investment per employee. As far 
as the positive impact of firm size is concerned, it is hardly surprising and in fact we 
find it reaffirmed in many other studies on Italian industry. With all due caution given 
the simple modelling and quality of data used in estimation, we see as particularly 
interesting the finding on the positive effects of vertical integration on the level of 
ICT investments per employee. This correlation could well imply that in a country 
like Italy, with a predominance of firms showing low vertical integration, the level of 
investments  in  ICT  is  actually  suboptimal.  Moreover,  it  would  appear  that  the 
positive pattern, rather than emerging from the simple differential between internal 
coordination  costs  and  market  transaction  costs,  could  derive  from  the 
complementarity of investment in ICT made by two firms for the enhancement of the 
final product and thus of the total pay-off to be shared. This is an aspect that calls for 
further  investigation,  but  it  could  well  cast  fresh  light  on  how,  as  the  new 
technological paradigm emerges, the organisational patterns change in the firms of a 
country that has been characterised for at least twenty years by a low level of vertical 
integration.  
    23 
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